

# **Participants in the forum are reminded of their responsibility to observe anti-trust laws**

The EBA Anti-Trust Policy is available at the EBA website

[https://www.abe-eba.eu/media/azure/production/1352/eba\\_antitrust\\_policy\\_20170602\\_final\\_clean.pdf](https://www.abe-eba.eu/media/azure/production/1352/eba_antitrust_policy_20170602_final_clean.pdf)

The forum is an open group, where interested stakeholders can discuss and exchange information on industry-wide topics.

The content of the slides presented and the views expressed in the context of the activities of the forum are those of the respective participants in the forum, and do not represent the views of the Euro Banking Association (EBA).

# Open Forum on Digital Transformation

Are fraud and cybercrime creating a significant threat to the financial services community? Join the EBA Open Forum on 11 July to find out how industry initiatives and regulation are helping to master the challenge!

11 July 2024  
Digital meeting

Closed user group

## Agenda (1/3)

Are fraud and cybercrime creating a significant threat to the financial services community? Find out how industry initiatives and regulation are helping to master the challenge!

Welcome and opening remarks

**Thomas Egner**, Euro Banking Association

Setting the scene and housekeeping

**Kate Pohl**, Projective Group

Are fraud + cybercrime creating a significant threat to the financial services community? How industry initiatives and regulation are helping to master the challenge

**Andrea Radu**, Deloitte

**Georges Gehchan**, Deloitte

Ethical hacking for financial stability

**Dr. Miriam Sinn**, Deutsche Bundesbank

*Coffee Break*

## Agenda (2/3)

Are fraud and cybercrime creating a significant threat to the financial services community? Find out how industry initiatives and regulation are helping to master the challenge!

Fraud and cybercrime are today's reality... but what is the industry doing about it? A view from various experts

**Dr. Boris Hemkemeier**, Commerzbank

**Hays Littlejohn**, EBA CLEARING

**Alvaro Azofra Martinez**, Europol

**Jan Osenegg**, Senior Advisory

**David-Jan Janse**, SurePay

**Brigitte De Wilde**, SWIFT

**Jörg Wiemer**, TIS

What is the Fraud Taxonomy and how can it be implemented by banks? Learnings and best practices

**Helene Gertsen**, Danske Bank

**Annick Moes**, Euro Banking Association

*Lunch Break*

## Agenda (3/3)

Are fraud and cybercrime creating a significant threat to the financial services community? Find out how industry initiatives and regulation are helping to master the challenge!

Regulations and regulatory compliance: what are the key themes and issues today? Looking at regulation from a legal perspective

**Marcus Columbu**, act AC Tischendorf Rechtsanwälte Partnerschaft mbB

The new Instant Payments Regulation: what we know and what is still in the grey zone... reading between the lines

**Roderick Kroon**, Projective Group

### *Coffee Break*

What is Verification of Payee? Why is it important? And what still needs to be done

**David Renault**, EBA CLEARING

**Ronny Wolf**, Commerzbank

Regulating the fraud chain in payments – what is to be expected?

**Dr. Matthias Terlau**, Görg

Wrap-up

**Thomas Egner**

**Secretary General  
Euro Banking Association**

**Kate Pohl**

**Executive Advisor  
Projective Group**



**Andrea Radu**

**Partner – Financial Services  
Deloitte**

**Georges Gehchan**

**Senior Manager Cyber Security Strategy  
Deloitte**

**Dr. Miriam Sinn**

**Head of TIBER Cyber Team  
Deutsche Bundesbank**

# Hacking for financial stability!

Miriam Sinn, Head of TIBER Cyber Team Germany



# What does the Bundesbank have to do with hackers?





# How can we test cyber resilience?

Penetration Testing



Red Teaming



TIBER




Image: Pixabay


Increasing intensity

# TIBER-DE – Testing Process

## Participants in a TIBER-DE test



# All lines of defence are put to the test





## And what did we learn?



Image: Pixabay

or



# Stories from every day life



Bilder: Pixabay

DORA



**Thank you for your attention!**



**TIBER Cyber Team**

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[www.bundesbank.de](http://www.bundesbank.de) > Aufgaben > Unbarer  
Zahlungsverkehr > TIBER-DE

# **Coffee Break**

## **10:20 – 10:35 CET**

During coffee break, do not “leave the meeting”  
(i.e., stay connected while muting your sound and turning off your camera)

# Panel Discussion

**Annick Moes**

**Head of Industry Issues  
and Cooperation Initiatives  
Euro Banking Association**

**Helene Gertsen**

**Senior Analyst  
Danske Bank**

# **Do you speak fraud?**

How the EBA Fraud Taxonomy can help cooperation  
against fraud

Annick Moes  
Euro Banking Association


EBA Open Forum: “Are fraud and cybercrime creating a significant threat to the financial services community?”

11 July 2024



# How the EBA Fraud Taxonomy can help fight fraud

European regulators are currently preparing the ground for the introduction of fraud data sharing solutions



**European Commission** proposes to “combat and mitigate payment fraud, by **enabling payment service providers to share fraud-related information between themselves**”

*(European Commission press release ‘Modernising payment services and opening financial services data: new opportunities for consumers and businesses’, 28 June 2023)*




**European Banking Authority** advises EU co-legislators and EU Commission to consider strengthening “the PSR proposal with a requirement to have a **single EU-wide platform, to be maintained and run by PSPs, for the sharing of fraud data** amongst PSPs”.

*(European Banking Authority opinion on new types of payment fraud and possible mitigants, April 2024)*

# What is the EBA Fraud Taxonomy?

Definition and objective



## EBA Fraud Taxonomy

Equips fraud fighters with a pan-European vocabulary and categorisation approach for **naming and organising fraud types** for payments, including card payments

## Implementation of the EBA Fraud Taxonomy means

- **one vocabulary set** for European PSPs
- **granular, actionable and comparable data** on payment fraud

# Why is the EBA Fraud Taxonomy better?

How does it make a difference?

## Top benefit



The common vocabulary and categorisation approach enable European PSPs to join forces in the fight against payment fraud.

## Other benefits

- Created and evolved by **30+ fraud experts from 15 European countries**, based on annual change process
- Applies to both **payment fraud and card fraud**
- Relies on **definitions from authoritative and publicly available sources**, wherever possible
- **Aligned with EBA Fraud Reporting Guidelines** under PSD2
- Allows **describing any payment fraud event in a concise manner** based on a standardised approach
  - supporting **easier and faster data point collection**
  - increasing **accuracy and comparability of fraud trend intelligence and data**
  - enabling PSPs to develop **effective fraud prevention campaigns** for their customers
- Can be used by any interested party (request your **free** copy at <https://www.abe-eba.eu/publications/>)

# How does the taxonomy work? Capturing the ‘how’, ‘what’, ‘who’ and ‘what else’

Explaining the different elements

## How?

### Method:

First point of contact between the fraudster and the victim or the point of compromise

## What?

### High-level classification:

Indicates strategic approach taken by the fraudster

- Narrative deployed by fraudster that triggers the desired reaction by the victim
- Account takeover by unauthorised party
- First party fraud

### Modus:

What trick the fraudster used

- Unauthorised and often manipulative action taken by fraudster

## Who?

**Initiator** of payment transaction  
(customer or fraudster or 1<sup>st</sup> party)

## What else?

### Label/tag:

Additional information to enrich the case – ensures ease of use and maximum flexibility

### Payment instrument (optional)

Enables users of the taxonomy to identify whether the fraudulent payment was an account-to-account transaction or a card payment

# How does the taxonomy work? Capturing the ‘who’, ‘how’, ‘what’, and ‘what else’

From fraud case to fraud type

## Fraud case description

### Who?

Initiator of payment transaction:

**Customer**

### How?

Method: **Phone contact**

Fraudster calls bank customer and tells him that she represents his bank

Fraudster tells customer that the bank identified several unauthorised transactions to be debited from customer’s account

Fraudster convinces customer to transfer his funds to a “safe account” indicated by fraudster



### What else?

Label/tag:

**Fake bank / financial institution  
Impersonation**

## What? (and why?)

**Why?** High-level classification: “**Your money/personal information is at risk**”

**What?** Modus: “Safe account fraud”

*“You’ll usually [be] contacted by someone saying they are from the bank or the police. They’ll (...) ask you to transfer your money to a “safe account” they have set up on your behalf. The account will belong to a fraudster.”*

Source: Barclays Bank UK ‘Ten common types of fraud and scam – 9. Safe account fraud’

# How does the EBA Fraud Taxonomy ensure better data?

Data quality beats data quantity (but it's good to have both)

## Separating the contact methods (“how”) used by fraudsters from the actual tricks they apply (“what”)


- Better data quality and more granular data, e.g. separate data points on entry door taken and trick applied

Traditional approach	EBA Fraud Taxonomy approach	
No separate categorisation of ‘how’ and ‘what’; no granularity on ‘what’	Separate categorisation of method (‘how’)	Separate categorisation and precise identification of (‘what’)
Phishing	E-mail contact	E.g. Phoney debt/bill collection
Smishing	Text message contact	E.g. Fake institution
Vishing	Phone contact	E.g. Safe account fraud

# EBA Fraud Taxonomy captures complex fraud strategies

The taxonomy identifies the strategic approach taken by the fraudster

## Overview of mod



## EBA Fraud Taxonomy identifies the strategic approach taken by the fraudster:

- Narrative that triggers the desired reaction by the victim (social engineering)
- Account / card / card details takeover by unauthorised party
- First party fraud



# Thank you!

Annick Moes, EBA Head of Industry Issues and Cooperation Initiatives

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<https://www.abe-eba.eu>

<https://www.linkedin.com/company/euro-banking-association>



## **Lunch Break**

### **12:10 – 13:15 CET**

During lunch break, do not “leave the meeting”  
(i.e., stay connected while muting your sound and turning off your camera)

Kindly reconnect on time for the afternoon sessions

# **Marcus Columbu**

**Partner**

**act AC Tischendorf Rechtsanwälte Partnerschaft mbB**



act legal Germany

# EBA Open Forum on Digital Transformation

11 July 2024 | Marcus Columbu

- |           |  |
|-----------|--|
| <b>01</b> | Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA) - Background, Objectives & Use |
| <b>02</b> | Being ahead of the curve – regulatory as an advantage in competition     |
| <b>03</b> | Remuneration   |
| <b>04</b> | Credit & ESG Risks   |
| <b>05</b> | Compliance Risk Analysis   |
| <b>06</b> | Contact  |



# Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA)

Background, Objectives & Use





# Background & Objectives

## Background

- DORA is part of the European Commission's Digital Finance Package of 2020 consisting of:
  - DORA Regulation
  - MiCA Regulation (Markets in Crypto Assets)
  - Retail Payment Strategy
  - Digital finance strategy
- Based on FinTech Action Plan (2018) and ESAs' Joint Advice (2019)


## Objectives

- Strengthening the security and operational resilience of the entire European financial sector
- Establish standardised and consistent requirements across the financial sector
- Introducing proportionate requirements (proportionality principle)



## Area of application

- Whole financial sector
- CRR Credit institutions, payment institutions (including registered account information service providers), e-money institutions, investment firms, crypto service providers (MiCA), CSDs, CCPs, trading venues, trade repositories, management companies, AIFM, data reporting services, insurance and reinsurance undertakings, insurance intermediaries, institutions for occupational retirement provision, credit rating agencies, administrators of critical benchmarks, securitisation repositories, crowdfunding service providers.
- Exemptions in Art. 2 para. 3 DORA







# DORA's Key Elements

1

## ICT Risk Management

- Governance and organisation
- ICT Risk Management Framework
- ICT systems, protocols and tools
- Learning and development
- Communications

2

## ICT Third Party Risk Management

- General principles (including information register on contractual relationships with ICT third parties, notifications to supervisory authorities and minimum contract terms)
- Oversight of critical third party ICT service providers

3

## ICT incident reporting

- Definition of ICT Incidents
- Classification criteria for ICT incidents
- Reporting process, reporting of ICT-related incidents and cyber threats

4

## Digital resilience testing

- Baseline tests
- Entire financial sector
- Vulnerability scanning, source code testing, performance testing, etc.

5

## Threat Led Penetration Tests

- Advanced tests
- Only "systemically important" financial institutions with a high level of ICT maturity

6

## Information Sharing & Cyber Exercises

- Voluntary information and knowledge sharing between financial organisations
- Cross-sectoral crisis management and emergency exercises



# Being ahead of the curve

## Regulatory as an advantage in competition


02





# Case Studies

From being **behind of the curve** to **being ahead of the curve**




# Client #1: Asset Manager

Behind the curve

Hardly any rules & procedures

Purely quantitative,  
variable salary



Lack of qualitative specifications for sales

Lack of 4-eyes-principle

Overall neglect of regulatory framework

- Approx. 100 investor lawsuits in three years
- approx. EUR 25,000 legal fees per case → i.e. EUR 2.5 million in total
- Indirect reputational damage EUR >10 million
- Approximately 15 to 20% higher cost to implement compliance structures



# Client #1: Asset Manager

Ahead of the curve

Clear set of policies, rules and procedures

Sustainability strategy defined and implemented




- Fewer than 5 investor claims in 10 years
- AuM and clients more than doubled in 5 years
- Higher salaries and employee satisfaction
- EBITDA almost tripled

# Client #2: Real Estate Fund Manager

Behind the curve

Compliance as a “fig leaf”

Purely quantitative,  
variable compensation



No "Tone from the Top"

Giving contracts to family and  
friends without any consequences

No team spirit

- Little growth
- Money laundering incidents
- High staff turnover, difficult to attract top talent
- Bad press, serious damage to reputation




# Client #2: Real Estate Fund Manager

Ahead of the curve

Introduction of easy-to-understand policies

Training on a regular basis

Creation of high levels of transparency



Open Feedback Culture / Mutual Exchange

Integrating compliance into key processes

Sustainable remuneration structures introduced

- 600% increase in high-caliber staff in 2 ½ years
- Salary increases of >40%.
- "Black sheep" voluntarily resigned → High employee satisfaction
- Risks significantly reduced
- Product portfolio and new businesses significantly expanded






# Reverse Case Study

From being ahead of the curve to being behind of the curve



# Client #3: Hedge Fund-Manager

Ahead of the curve



- Clear and simple processes
- Easy onboarding of large institutional investors
- Very successful launch with > EUR 1 billion AuM after first year
- Very high client satisfaction due to transparent reporting

# Client #3: Hedge Fund-Manager

Behind the curve

Failure to adopt ESG strategy  
despite game changing mindset

ESG compliance ignored



No ESG disclosures

Not trained or counseled regarding  
ESG

- Major customers have envisaged to reduce their commitments by up to 50%.
- Potential client not acquired. Reason: no ESG strategy
- Loss of two high-caliber employees
- Numerous justifications from existing clients
- Costly retrospective implementation of ESG strategy and compliance



# Takeaways & Conclusion






## Takeaways & Conclusion

### behind the curve

- Difficulty attracting new customers while retaining less desirable customers
- Difficulty in attracting and retaining staff with high staff turnover
- High risk of reputational damage and direct economic damage
- Very high implementation cost to remedy lack of regulatory compliance



### ahead of the curve

- Desirable AAA-Customers
- Clear and simple processes
- Easy onboarding of large institutional investors
- Very high client satisfaction due to transparent reporting



# Remuneration

03



# Special Part 8 (BT 8) 1/2

## Overview

Basis:

ESMA's guidelines on some aspects of MiFID II remuneration requirements

Increase in salary & promotion

**Remuneration policies and procedures**

- The new ESMA guidelines extend the previous requirements for compensation systems to all types of salary increases and promotions.
- Personnel development measures must not only be based on purely quantitative criteria, but must also take sufficient account of qualitative criteria.

Qualitative components of the remuneration


**Importance of qualitative criteria in determining compensation**

- The design of quantitative criteria must not give rise to conflicts of interest.
- Any remaining conflicts of interest must be "mitigated" by the use of other criteria, such as compliance with suitability requirements or client satisfaction.
- ESMA guidelines now explicitly refers to "equally weighted" qualitative and quantitative criteria.



# Special Part 8 (BT 8) 2/2

## Overview






# Credit & ESG Risks



# EBA guidelines for lending and credit monitoring


Further development

- ESG risks in processes, risk measurement and reporting
- Real estate business
- Model requirements
- Business model analysis
- Large development banks



# ESG-Requirements

ESG requirements are fully integrated throughout the risk framework:





# Compliance Risk Analysis

Considering quantitative and qualitative risk





# Contact

6



# Ihr Ansprechpartner: Marcus Columbu



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## Practice Areas

Banking-/Financial Services Regulatory  
 Compliance-Projects  
 Compliance Officer  
 Supervisory Board

## CV

Marcus Columbu is a partner at ACT since 2015. Previously, he worked for several years at a major law firm in the area of Banking Regulatory, including the interface to M&A. He is external chief compliance officer, anti-money laundering and ESG officer of numerous regulated and non-regulated companies. He is also member of the Supervisory Board of Varengold Bank AG. His particular expertise includes the design and implementation of compliance management systems (CMS), the optimization of existing processes and the implementation of new, efficient and sustainable processes. He specializes in efficient and pragmatic solutions to ad-hoc compliance and regulatory issues and the sustainable further development of CMS.

Marcus Columbu is a member of the Bankrechtliche Vereinigung-Wissenschaftliche Gesellschaft für Bankrecht e.V. and of the Frankfurt Working Group Compliance & Governance with a focus on MaRisk compliance, compliance management systems and money laundering.

Marcus Columbu is consistently recognized in the relevant rankings:

- Legal500, recommended lawyer Compliance and Regulatory (2024)
- WirtschaftsWoche, Top Lawyer Regulatory (2022, 2023, 2024)
- Handelsblatt / Best Lawyers Finance (2022)





**Roderick Kroon**

**Senior Consultant  
Projective Group**

# The new Instant Payments Regulation

**What we know and what is still in the grey zone... Reading between the lines!**


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# Instant? ..... It is the new normal in many situations



**Instant  
is already the  
new normal**



# Instant Payments – everywhere now



**Faster and Secure Transfers  
Singapore**



**Swiss Instant Payments**



**New Payments Platform  
Australia**



**Faster Payment System  
Hong Kong**

# Instant Payments in the SEPA zone

The first formal version of the SCT Inst Scheme Rulebook was approved by the EPC Board on **November 2016!**



## SEPA Instant Credit Transfer Scheme Rulebook

EPC004-16/ 2021 Version 1.1 / Date issued: 13 December 2021 / Date effective: 11 January 2022

Public



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**IMPORTANT MESSAGE**

On 25 October 2022, the EPC decided that the entry-into-force time of the 2023 SCT Inst Scheme Rulebook is set for 19 November 2023 at 03:30:00.000 CET (instead of 08:00:00.000 CET communicated in version 1.0 of the 2023 SCT Inst Scheme Rulebook).

This new entry-into-force time will be preceded by a **SEPA-wide 30 minutes downtime period from 03:00:00.000 CET up to 03:30:00.000 CET**. During that downtime period, no single SCT Inst Instruction, Transaction, R-transaction, Transaction Investigation and any response message related to them will be possible.

Up to 03:00:00.000 CET, all SCT Inst payment messages will be in the 2009 version of the ISO 20022 standard. As of 03:30:00.000 CET, all SCT Inst payment messages will be in the 2019 version of that same standard.

  
**SEPA Instant Credit Transfer  
Scheme Rulebook**

EPC004-16/ 2023 Version 1.1 / Date issued: 27 October 2022 / Date effective: 19 November 2023


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
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# SEPA Instant Payments

## How are they different?



Within seconds, irrevocable



Potential amount limits



24x7x365




Confirmation receipt  
(pos/neg - TIME-OUTs)



Consumer vs. business

*Head of Payments, SWIFT : “The major challenges in this domain are not the latency and speed, as many would expect, but the 24/7 guaranteed availability: the network as well as the endpoints at -and CSM- side have to foresee full 24/7 operations, even during upgrades, releases, unforeseen outages of any hardware component “*


# 4 corner model – SCT INSTANT





# Current SCT Instant rulebook version

The current SCT Instant rulebook determines how the value chain is organised



**Currently (CSM) VAS:**


- Non-time critical
- Transaction limit

**No CSM interoperability**


- But CSM's offer to forward a transaction to/from TIPS if needed (TIPS routing services)

# Instant Payments Regulation – Why?


- EPC does not like the slow uptake and differences in approach between the EU countries (premium instrument vs the new normal)



SCT Inst usage within SEPA has steadily risen since its introduction in 2017, now accounting for 15% of all SCT transactions



After rapid acceleration in 2019 and 2020, annual growth of SCT Inst transactions is currently slowing



There is a big difference between countries

# Instant Payments Regulation – What will change?

Ambition of the new IPR:

1. Making Euro Instant payments universally available
2. Making Euro Instant payments accessible at no extra cost
3. Increasing trust in Euro Instant payments (VoP)
4. Making sanctions screening of Euro Instant payments more efficient

*"All payment services providers (with very **targeted exceptions**) that offer credit transfers in euro must offer instant payments in euro to all their customers".*





- Will all banks move> => **NO**
- Will the 'classic' SCT disappear? => **NO**

# Instant Payments Regulation – What happened?




# Instant Payments Regulation – New rules??

- The recently published IPR does introduce **new processing rules** and **mandatory features**
- The IPR and current SCT Inst rulebooks are **not (yet) aligned**
- Interoperability of VoP schemes a challenge. Final rulebook in Sept., **will local flavours be allowed?**



# Instant Payments Regulation – Processing rules

There is a key difference between the IPR and the existing SEPA Instant rulebook



# Relation IPR & Fraud? (1 of 3)

Experiences show that there are **no new forms of fraud** emerging from instant payments, still the new scheme features provide **numerous opportunities for fraudsters** to exploit:

## Posting speed



- Time out if processing (E2E) if > 10 seconds
- Funds available immediately
- Funds sent to Bank account directly instead of prefunded account



- Risk of 'time-out' makes that required checks might be done with less accuracy/quality because a PSP is 'running out of time'
- Time to respond to fraud is limited with beneficiary able to move funds i.e.: money mules

## 24/7/365 availability



- Continuous availability
- Increased utility for sending/receiving party



- Fraudsters can work off-peak hours i.e.: when PSP staff inactive – victims may not be able to report fraud timely



# Relation IPR & Fraud? (2 of 3)



## Payment finality

- Payment cannot be reversed
- Improved cash flow
- Lack of chargeback increases attractiveness compared to cards



- SCT Inst payment cannot be easily reversed, unlike card payment with chargeback
- Funds hard to recover due to speed to identify fraudulent payment and fraudster reactivity



## PSU limits adjustments

- IPR states that if a PSU wants to change their transaction or daily limit this needs to be executed IMMEDIATELY
- Maximum (scheme) limits (now 100.000 EUR for TIPS) are likely to be removed
- Higher limits means more use cases supported



- High transaction limits makes SCT Inst attractive to fraudsters
- The obligation for immediate change is fully against current fraud prevention practices to have a **'cool off' period of (average) 4 hours** to make this limit change effective

# Relation IPR & Fraud – all bad news then? (3 of 3)

Fortunately, it is not all bad news




## Verification of Payee

- VoP checks are mandatory in the channels
- For both SCT Inst as well as Classic SEPA
- Even 'Opt in' for VoP on bulk payment files



- From countries that have implemented VoP the fraud rates have been reduced significantly
- Still, the need to support VoP for bulk files is seen by many parties, including corporates, as introducing unnecessary complexity (unhappy flows ....)  
**=> is a default opt-out or 'two-step' approach (legally) allowed?**



## 'Switching'

- Best practice is to build a 'switch' between Classic SEPA and SEPA Instant
  - With amount thresholds (all > 50 EUR)
  - For all SCT out



- The regulation is not very clear if a PSP has to offer SCT Inst as 'default' and when the classic SCT still can be used (Standing order?)
- In case of Fraud alerts/suspicion a best practice is to be able to switch (temporary) to SEPA Classic. Here you have more time to check what is happening, hold a 'batch' a little longer before sending it to the CSM



## Value added services

- To combat payment fraud new services are introduced
- Making use of advanced technology for fraud pattern and anomaly detection (FPAD)



- Plug-ins on top of PSP's fraud prevention and transaction processing capabilities
- These services are being introduced by VoP solution providers but as well by CSM's and for example SWIFT

# Instant Payments Regulation – What's next?

- Make sure you are prepared
- Look at solutions in the market that may help you ....
- Study final response of ECB to FAQ's and keep contact with local associations
- Await the publication of the new rulebooks for VoP (Sept) and SCT Inst (Nov)

# Thank you

Do you want to talk about Instant Payments (Regulation)?  
Feel free to reach out

Roderick Kroon  
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[Roderick.kroon@projectivegroup.com](mailto:Roderick.kroon@projectivegroup.com)



## **Coffee Break**

### **14:35 – 14:50 CET**

During coffee break, do not “leave the meeting”  
(i.e., stay connected while muting your sound and turning off your camera)

**David Renault**

**Team Leader SEPA  
EBA CLEARING**

**Ronny Wolf**

**Vice President  
Commerzbank AG**

**Dr. Matthias Terlau**

**Partner  
Görg**





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
# Regulating the fraud chain in payments – What's to be expected (PSR/PSD3)?

**EBA Open Forum on Digital Transformation**

Dr Matthias Terlau | 11 July 2024

# Card fraud in Europe - ECB statistics

- **Fraudulent card transactions** measured by the total value of card payments made with cards issued in the euro payments area (SEPA):



2021:

- 0.028 % corresponds to a value of € 1.53 billion with a total value of all card payments of € 5.40 trillion
- lowest level since data collection began

- Card not present (**CNP**) fraud measured by the total value of card fraud

2021: 84 %

- Decrease of 12 % following implementation of strong customer authentication in accordance with PSD2

# Card fraud in Europe - ECB statistics

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Nevertheless, industry, regulators and consumers need to remain vigilant. 2020 and 2021 were exceptional years, with the COVID-19 pandemic and the related measures (e.g. lockdowns) having a notable impact on both card payments and fraud; among other factors, both international travel and the cross-border use of cards were limited by the pandemic. Furthermore, the aforementioned success of both industry and regulatory measures in reducing card fraud may shift the attention of fraudsters towards card holders, potentially further increasing fraud through social engineering (e.g. by manipulation of the payer) or the theft of physical cards.

# Legislative procedure

- **28 June 2023:** Proposals of the EU Commission
  - **End of 2023:** EU Council: Progress report of the Spanish Presidency
  - **14 February 2024:** Vote on proposed amendments in the ECON Committee
- **And now? A break for now ... Election to the EU Parliament**  
(discontinuity principle, inaugural meeting on 16/7/24)


**Adoption expected between Q3/24 – Q1/25**

**Application\* expected between Q1/26 – Q3/26**

\* Application PSR after 18 months, implementation PSD3 within 18 months,

# Implementation of the Retail Payment Strategy

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## PSD3/PSR

- Strengthening the internal payments market
- Improvement XS2A
- Improve fraud prevention
- Strengthening payment institutions

## Instant Payment-VO / d€-VO

- European payment sovereignty
- Global payment security and convenience

## Digital Markets Act / FIDA

- Opening up infrastructures to competition
- Opening up the financial market to competition

# Reform through PSR and PSD3

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Cash supply

Group exemption

Fee regulation

XS2A fees

No standardised APIs

XS2A-Dash Board

Name Check

Fraud monitoring

SCA regulation

Liability for social  
engineering

Participation of  
telecoms and online  
platforms

Payment institutions

# Reform through PSR and PSD3

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**Focus of the PSR -  
Payment security and  
fraud prevention**

Name Check

Fraud monitoring

SCA regulation


Liability for social  
engineering

Participation of  
telecoms and online  
platforms





# Regulation of payment security: parties involved

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# Payment security regulation system



# Innovations in internal security measures

# Monitoring

## ■ Risk minimisation measures and control mechanisms for risks

Art.  
81-83  
PSR-E



- Monitoring, incident management, also inclusion of behavioural data
- Econ Committee: **e-wallet providers** as obligated parties
- Liability of the PSP if IBAN or other of a payee is **not blocked** although reported as fraudulent or involved in fraud
- Information sharing arrangements on fraudulent payees between PSPs & liability

# **New features for external security measures**

# Name check and liability

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Art. 50  
PSR-E

- Name check for all transfers (for SEPA already in IP-Reg; PSR extends this to other schemes, Target2)
- In case of discrepancy - payer may still authorise
- In real time for all payment releases
- Liability: payer's PSP liable, recourse



Art. 57  
PSR-E

# Call centre equipment and communication



- Discussion in the Econ Committee:

Art. 53  
(1) (c)  
PSR-E

- CC employees Language skills
- Sufficient qualification of the CC employee
- (Ltd.) Access without prior identification of the user

- **Communication:** Discussion in the Econ Committee

Art. 53  
(1) (a)  
PSR-E

- Use of secure communication channels
- "in principle" no sending of links or documents by e-mail



# SCA for direct debit & MIT

- **Direct debit excluded**, but not entirely clear ("without interaction or involvement of the payer"?)  
Art. 85 (2) PSR-E



- **MIT still excluded**, Art. 85 (2) PSR-E;  
**New right to reimbursement for MIT** (no questions asked) within 8 weeks (Art. 62 (1) (UAbs. 3) PSR-E)

# Facilitated implementation of SCA

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Art. 85  
(12)  
PSR-E

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- New: **two factors from the same group allowed**  
(2x knowledge, 2x possession, 2x inference)
- **Econ Committee:** not 2x knowledge, but inference may also include behavioural characteristics
- **Discussion in the Econ Committee:** SCA free of charge in any case



# SCA at MoTo



Art. 85 (7)  
PSR-E

- **MOTO** (Mail Order, Telephone Order)
  - **No SCA**
  - but **another form of authentication**



# SCA for vulnerable groups

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Art. 88  
PSR-E

- Persons who **do not have access to digital channels or payment instruments** (persons with disabilities, low digital skills, elderly people)
- SCA **not just a single means of authentication**
  - Not limited by possession of a smartphone



# ApplePay etc & strong customer authentication (SCA)



**Face Not Recognized**

Enter your Password

Cancel

- Apple Pay / Google Pay as outsourcing?
- significant outsourcing? / ICT-services DORA
- Consequences (among others):
  - Written outsourcing agreement,
  - Review and monitoring obligations of the institutions

Art. 87  
PSR-E

# Liability of payment service providers

# Liability for failure to carry out strong customer authentication

## ■ So far:

- PSD2: increased liability for non-application of SCA
- Not where exemptions apply (some German courts)

## ■ Commission proposal:

- In future: Stricter liability regulations even when using an exemption
- **Criticism:**
  - Exemptions user-friendly; banks should not bear risk
  - Particularly clear for the exemption of white listing



# **Small revolution: Strict liability of banks for social engineering**

# The Proposal by the EU Commission


Art. 59  
(1)  
PSR-E

## ■ Impersonisation Fraud:

- Third party pretends to be a "bank employee",
- ECON Committee: or as a police officer or as a technical service provider
- with name, telephone number or e-mail address of the bank (the police etc.)
- Manipulation of PSU to initiate a payment transaction

## ■ Full refund to PSU

- unless fraud or gross negligence on part of the PSU



# Legislative justification of strict liability for social engineering

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- **Justification** of the new strict liability?
  - **economic consideration** (Cooter/Ulen, Law and Economics, 2016): Liability is allocated where it can best be **insured**
  - **Central preventive measures** (e.g. customer education, process design) can take place
  - Double-sided incentive to avoid damage through negligence exemption

## **Involvement of third parties (telecoms, online platforms)**

# Discussion since June 2023

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- **Proposals ECON Committee 14 February 2024:**

- **Security measures by providers of electronic communications services,**
  - ✓ Removal of illegal or fraudulent content
  - ✓ Information / education of users, including alerts
  - ✓ Provide ways for users to report
- **Obligation of all service providers in the fraud chain (PSP, telco, online platforms)**
  - ✓ to take technical and organisational measures

# Conclusion



# Small revolution and otherwise Fine Tuning

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- through PSD3/PSR
  - Fraud prevention system intensively sharpened
  - PSR tries to close gaps in the payment security system
  - Significant additional liability obligations
  - SCA refined
  - Involvement of third parties in the fraud chain
  
- **Other challenges in the coming months**
  - Implementation of the Instant Payment Regulation
  - DORA





**Dr Matthias Terlau**  
Partner


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Thank you very much for  
your attention!

Further information at  
[payment-law.eu](http://payment-law.eu)

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# Wrap-up

**Thank you!**

## **Participants in the forum are reminded of their responsibility to observe anti-trust laws.**

The EBA Anti-Trust Policy is available on the EBA website.

[https://www.abe-eba.eu/media/azure/production/1352/eba\\_antitrust\\_policy\\_20170602\\_final\\_clean.pdf](https://www.abe-eba.eu/media/azure/production/1352/eba_antitrust_policy_20170602_final_clean.pdf)

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